The semantics of slurs: a refutation of pure expressivism

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A B S T R A C T

In several recent contributions to the growing literature on slurs, Hedger (2012, 2013) draws upon Kaplan's (1999) distinction between descriptive and expressive content to argue that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content. The distinction between descriptive and expressive content and the view that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content has been widely acknowledged in prior work (e.g., Kaplan, 1999; Kratzer, 1999; Potts, 2003, 2005, 2007; Potts and Kawahara, 2004; Pullum and Rawlins, 2007; Potts et al., 2009), and Hedger (2012, 2013) aims to contribute to this tradition of scholarship by offering novel arguments in support of his “pure expressivist” account of slurs (henceforth PE). But the account that PE offers is explanatorily inadequate, resting on suspect a priori intuitions which also commit one to denying many basic facts about slurs, such as that slurs largely display systematic differential application and that slurs can be used non-offensively between in-group speakers. In this article I provide clear reasons for rejecting PE, arguing particularly against Hedger (2012, 2013) as one of PE’s most explicit and recent proponents. In showing that PE is inadequate in at least 11 ways, I argue in favor of a mixed or hybrid approach.

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1. Introduction

In several recent contributions to the growing literature on slurs, Hedger (2012, 2013) draws upon Kaplan's (1999) distinction between descriptive and expressive content to argue that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content. The distinction between descriptive and expressive content and the view that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content has been widely acknowledged in prior work (e.g., Kaplan, 1999; Kratzer, 1999; Potts, 2003, 2005, 2007; Potts and Kawahara, 2004; Pullum and Rawlins, 2007; Potts et al., 2009), and Hedger (2012, 2013) aims to contribute to this tradition of scholarship by offering novel arguments in support of his “pure expressivist” account of slurs (henceforth PE). But the account that PE offers is explanatorily inadequate, resting on suspect a priori intuitions which also commit one to denying many basic facts about slurs, such as that slurs largely display systematic differential application and that slurs can be used non-offensively between in-group speakers. In this article I provide clear reasons for rejecting PE, arguing particularly against Hedger (2012, 2013) as one of PE’s most explicit and recent proponents. In showing that PE is inadequate in at least 11 ways, I argue in favor of a mixed or hybrid approach.

Towards this end the present article will proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces what slurs are along with several basic facts that an adequate framework for slurs ought to account for. Section 3 reviews the purely expressive account of slurs (PE) most recently and explicitly advocated by Hedger (2012, 2013) and inspects how the projection behavior of slurs differs markedly from expressions with purely descriptive content. Next we turn to review three key cases Hedger (2012, 2013) considers in support of PE’s claim that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content, while Section 4 provides a
critical evaluation of these cases. In Section 5 we then look at several recent empirical considerations on the non-derogatory use of slurs, while Section 6 concludes. But let us now start from the beginning and first introduce what slurs are.

2. Slurs and some basics for an account

Slurs, such as *nigger* or *faggot*, are expressions that are often used to derogate certain group members and have been considered among the most offensive of all linguistic expressions (Kennedy, 2002, p. 23; Anderson and Lepore, 2013, p. 25). Often considered a form of “hate speech [. . .] directed to a group of people, based on a shared characteristic of that group,” slurs are generally considered derogatory expressions that target certain group members on the basis of descriptive features such as their racial or sexual identity, with racial slurs such as *nigger* primarily targeting people on the basis of race-based features and sexual slurs such as *faggot* primarily targeting people on the basis of sex-based features (Fraleigh and Tuman, 2010, p. 139), Himma (2002), for example, suggests that a linguistically adequate dictionary might “define “nigger” as “a slur that is wrongfully used to oppress black persons on the basis of race [. . . and] define “faggot” as “a term wrongfully used to oppress male homosexuals on the basis of sexual preference” (p. 518, 521, fn. 23). So an application of a particular slur in context does not occur at random, but instead based on considerations of their systematic differential application-conditions, which concern descriptive features of targets such as their racial or sexual identity. This is not only how speakers are able to systematically distinguish between relatively broader categories of slurs (e.g., the racial slur *nigger* from the sexual slur *faggot*) but further how speakers are able to systematically distinguish between relatively narrower categories of slurs (e.g., the racial slur *nigger* from the racial slur *gook*) within those broader categories. That there are in fact different types of slurs applied differentially towards targets is noncontroversial – as Anderson and Lepore (2013) rightly point out, there in fact exists a large variety of slurs “that target groups on the basis of race (‘nigger’), nationality (‘kraut’), religion (‘kike’), gender (‘bitch’), sexual orientation (‘fag’), immigrant status (‘wetback’) and sundry other demographics” (p. 25) – and accounting for this basic fact has been outlined in prior work as one of several conditions to be met by any explanatorily adequate account of slurs.

Another basic fact about slurs that must be accounted for is their ability to offend, as this has been a central point of focus in prior work on slurs (e.g., Anderson and Lepore, 2013, p. 25; Hedger, 2012, p. 74). The potential offensiveness of slurs is not only evidenced by the fact that their use has often initiated violence and ended in homicide (Hoover, 2007; Kiefer, 2010; Fox 10 News, 2010; Islam, 2011; Wilkinson, 2011), but is further evidenced by more straightforwardly linguistic considerations, such as through an analysis of their projection behavior across a diverse range of linguistic contexts. The projection behavior of slurs has been investigated at great length in prior work (Potts, 2007; Hom, 2008, 2010; Williamson, 2009; McCready, 2010; Croom, 2011, 2013; Hom, 2012; Anderson and Lepore, 2013; Hay, 2012; Whiting, 2013), and Hedger (2012, 2013) rightly draws upon considerations of this kind to argue that the projection behavior of slurs differs markedly from that of expressions with purely descriptive content. Hedger (2012, 2013) also draws upon these considerations to ground his defense of PE, which, as I show in Section 4, is explanatorily inadequate and commits one to several untenable conclusions. As it will be made clear in Section 4, the endorsement of PE by Hedger (2012, 2013) along with several others before (Kaplan, 1999; Kratzer, 1999; Potts, 2003, 2005, 2007; Potts and Kawahara, 2004; Pullum and Rawlins, 2007; Potts et al., 2009) in fact rests on suspect a priori intuitions that commit one to denying many basic facts about slurs, such as that slurs largely display systematic differential application (e.g., the slurs *gook* and *slut* are differentially applied towards different targets, with this differential application being systematic) and that slurs can be used non-offensively between in-group speakers. But before discussing reasons for rejecting PE, let us first briefly review it in some detail along with its explanatory merits.

3. Slurs and pure expressivism

In his article “The Semantics of Racial Slurs,” Hedger (2012) follows a rich tradition of linguists and philosophers of language that have drawn upon Kaplan’s (1999) distinction between descriptive and expressive content to aid them in their analyses of linguistic expressions (Kratzer, 1999; Potts, 2003, 2005, 2007; Potts and Kawahara, 2004; Pullum and Rawlins, 2007; Potts et al., 2009). The distinction between descriptive and expressive content became well acknowledged as research on expressive content became increasingly fashionable, which was no doubt partly owed to the publication of *The Logic of Conventional Implicature*, where Potts (2005) developed a multidimensional logic $L_{CI}$ for handling conventional implicatures.}

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1. See adequacy condition 2 of 6 in Croom (2011, p. 355), and adequacy condition 2 of 7 in Croom (2013, p. 200).

(CIs) including (on his view) expressives. Following this influential research tradition, Hedger (2012, 2013) draws upon the distinction between descriptive and expressive content in order to provide an analysis of slurring expressions in particular and to argue that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content. As Hedger (2012) explains this distinction, “descriptive content [. . .] represents the world as being a certain way, and as such can be either true or false” whereas “expressive content [. . .] merely display[s] an attitude of the speaker, and as such are not truth-apt” (p. 76; see also Potts, 2005, p. 7).

Hedger (2012) offers examples of expressions with purely descriptive content, which include black and elephant (p. 78), as well as examples of expressions with purely expressive content, which include fucker (p. 77) and all instances of slurs (p. 74, 78; see also Hedger, 2013). Hedger (2012, 2013) draws upon this distinction between purely descriptive and purely expressive content to account for the inoffensiveness of expressions like Korean American and the offensiveness of expressions like gook. Since expressions with purely descriptive content (e.g., woman) are typically inoffensive whereas expressions with purely expressive content (e.g., fucker) are typically offensive, by arguing that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content Hedger (2012, 2013) aims to account for the particularly salient ability of slurs to offend. As Hedger (2012) explains his purely expressive view, “The view here offered for your consideration is that slurs contain merely expressive content – i.e., they display an attitude of contempt on the part of the speaker toward their targets – but they lack an extension, and hence don’t make truth-apt contributions to semantic content” (p. 77–78). Hedger (2013) further explains that PE is committed to the view that “Slurs express contempt regardless of the attitude or particular use of the speaker. In the case of slurs, the independent meaning just is an offensive expression of contempt; hence the expression is part of the semantic content of slurs” (p. 209).4

Because Hedger (2012, 2013) follows a tradition of scholarship holding a strict distinction between purely descriptive and purely expressive content such that the content of each expression is either descriptive or expressive but not mixed (Kaplan, 1999; Kratzer, 1999; Potts, 2003, 2005, 2007; Potts and Kawahara, 2004; Pullum and Rawlins, 2007; Potts et al., 2009), Hedger’s (2012) strategy is the straightforward one of aiming to show that slurs are not expressions with purely descriptive content and so must be expressions with purely expressive content instead. The way that Hedger (2012) aims to show that slurs are not expressions with purely descriptive content is to show that the projection behavior of slurs differs markedly from that of expressions with purely descriptive content, and that the two must therefore be distinct.

Hedger (2012) provides several examples showing how the projection behavior of slurs differs from that of expressions with purely descriptive content, and such examples have been well-rehearsed in prior work (Potts, 2007; Hom, 2008, 2010, 2012; Williamson, 2009; McCready, 2010; Croom, 2011, 2013; Anderson and Lepore, 2013; Hay, 2012; Whiting, 2013). In “The Expressive Dimension,” for instance, Potts (2007) considered the slur nigger as an example of an expressive item, which is to be distinguished from a descriptive item in that only expressives display a joint set of linguistic properties which include (i) nondisplaceability, (ii) independence, (iii) immediacy, and (iv) descriptive ineffability (p. 166–167, 181; see also Potts and Kawahara, 2004, p. 254–255). Since these properties have already been well-discussed, it will suffice to review just one

3 This along with subsequent work by Potts (2007) has been regarded by the linguistic community as “Really Fucking Brilliant” (Geurts, 2007).

4 Hedger (2012) cites Kaplan’s unpublished manuscript from (2004), but since it has been available since at least (1999) I here cite the earlier version.

5 Following this influential research tradition, Hedger (2012, 2013) draws upon the

6 Hom (2008) similarly considered “derogatory autonomy” as adequacy condition 3 of 6 for slurs and claimed that “The derogatory force for any epithet is independent of the attitudes of any of its particular speakers” (p. 426). As Hom (2008) argued for this point: “For example, uses of ‘chink’ carry the same derogatory force no matter how racist or nonracist the particular speaker is towards Chinese people. Another example of autonomy is how derogatory variation is independent of particular speakers’ attitudes. A speaker may be extremely prejudiced toward the English and not at all prejudiced toward African-Americans, and yet this psychological state will have almost no effect on the pejorative force of the speaker’s uses of ‘limey’ and ‘nigger’” (p. 426). I reject Hom’s (2008) inclusion of derogatory autonomy as an adequacy condition on slurs, as well as Hedger’s (2012, 2013) acceptance of it, based on empirical grounds since it is a fact that slurs are often used non-derogatorily, and even positively, between in-group speakers. This point is further discussed in Sections 4–5 of the present work, in Section 5 in Croom (2011), in Section 9 in Croom (2013), and in Section 3 in Croom (2014).

7 The basic arguments in support of PE are provided in Hedger (2012), with Hedger (2013) often relying and referring back to this earlier work, so I here discuss the key arguments in support of PE that are provided earlier in Hedger (2012). Interestingly enough, even though Hedger (2012, 2013) does not cite Croom (2011), it is clear that most of the correct points that are made by Hedger (2012) and Hedger (2013) were already previously discussed in Sections 1–4 in Croom (2011) and Section 5 in Croom (2011), respectively. Explicating these points of comparison is not the main aim of the present work, but the reader can easily see these points of comparison by consulting Croom (2011, 2013) and Hedger (2012, 2013).

8 As Potts and Kawahara (2004) have argued, when expressions display (i) the property of nondisplaceability, those expressions “tell us about the speaker’s beliefs in the utterance situation” (p. 255), (ii) the property of independence, those expressions are “multidimensional in the sense that” each expression “contributes a meaning that is independent of the meaning of the main clause” (p. 256), (iii) the property of immediacy, those expressions are such that each “achieve[s] their intended act simply by being uttered [. . .] in this sense, they are performative” (p. 257), (iv) the property of descriptive ineffability, those expressions are such that “speakers are never fully satisfied when they [are] paraphrase[d]” (p. 258). Potts (2007) has further suggested that when expressions display (v) the property of perspective dependence, those expressions are “evaluated from a particular perspective,” and that “In general, the perspective is the speaker’s, but [that] there can be deviations if conditions are right” (p. 166), and (vi) the property of repeatability, those expressions are such that “If a speaker repeatedly uses an expressive item, the effect is generally one of strengthening the content, rather than one of redundancy” (p. 167). The general idea is that expressions with purely expressive content can be distinguished from expressions with purely descriptive content by the fact that only expressions with purely expressive content will jointly display properties (i) through (iv) or (vi) (according to Potts and Kawahara, 2004; Potts, 2007, respectively).
example Hedger (2012) considers involving the comparison between (1) and (2) below, “when S is a slur normally used to target blacks” (p. 78):

(1) If David is intelligent, then so is Judith.9
(2) If Obama is an S, then so is his wife.10

The basic point being made with an example like this is that, whereas a speaker of (1) can still plausibly deny that they have expressed anything about David (since intelligent, an expression with purely descriptive content,11 is embedded within the antecedent of the conditional), a speaker of (2) cannot still plausibly deny that they have expressed anything about Obama (even though the slurring expression S is likewise embedded within the antecedent of the conditional). Croom (2011) has offered a similar example before, but one that is somewhat clearer since the comparison it involves (between (3) and (4) shown below) more closely approximates a minimal pair and actually provides a concrete example of the slur under investigation (p. 345). So perhaps it is worth briefly considering it here in (3) and (4) below:

(3) If I didn’t like African Americans, then I’d probably be racist.12
(4) If I didn’t like niggers, then I’d probably be racist.13

Since in (3) the descriptive expression African American is embedded within the antecedent of the conditional, it is clear that a speaker uttering (3) does not generate the inference that they are racist simply in virtue of uttering (3). The speaker of (3) is only committed to saying that they probably would be racist if in fact they did not like African Americans, but that is an if they can plausibly deny. So the scope of the descriptive expression African American is restricted by the conditional and does not project out to generate the inference that the speaker uttering (3) presumably holds racist views. But notice that in (4), although the slurring expression niggers is embedded within the antecedent of the conditional, the derogatory force of niggers still manages to project out of its embedded position to generate the inference that the speaker uttering (4) presumably holds racist views. “For if the speaker were not currently in possession of derogatory attitudes,” Croom (2011) notes, “there are many other non-derogatory neutral descriptive terms that the speaker could have used, for instance, by saying (5a) [provided in (3) above] instead” (p. 345; see also Finlay, 2005, p. 19).14 Potts (2007) identified this property of slurs as the immediacy property, explaining that “the immediacy property ensures that the damage is done as soon as nigger escapes his lips” (p. 181), and by considering examples like these which show how the projection behavior of slurs differs markedly from that of expressions with purely descriptive content, Hedger (2012) seems to have a strong case in support of the claim that slurs cannot plausibly be considered as expressions that are purely descriptive.

After first arguing that slurs cannot plausibly be considered as expressions that are purely descriptive, Hedger (2012) then proceeds to further argue that slurs are expressions that are purely expressive instead. That is to say, Hedger (2012) attempts to reinforce the strict conceptual bifurcation between expressions with purely descriptive and purely expressive content that he has inherited from prior scholarship (Kaplan, 1999; Kratzer, 1999; Potts, 2003, 2005, 2007; Potts and Kawahara, 2004; Pullum and Rawlins, 2007; Potts et al., 2009) by attempting to demonstrate that slurs “lack descriptive content whatsoever” (p. 77) and “that slurs contain merely expressive content” (p. 78). Hedger (2012) argues for this further point that slurs are purely expressive by providing three key cases for consideration, the first case being that “When I would look up certain cuss words [in Spanish] I noticed that different dictionaries would give very different English expressions as translations” and that “It occurred to me that a vast number of derogatory expressions (particularly those considered most offensive) don’t obviously differ in meaning” (p. 77). Second, Hedger (2012) suggests that we consider the case of “the person who, while working on a car, hurls a wrench in frustration and yells “fucker!” It would be odd to claim that this person has described the wrench or the car as being a certain way” (p. 77). Presumably this is because a purely expressive expression like fucker “doesn’t describe […] at all, but merely expresses an attitude of contempt” (Hedger, 2012, p. 77). Third, Hedger (2012) suggests that we consider the following case, “when S is a slur normally used to target blacks, and the utterer of (17) [provided in (5) below] points15 to, say, a person of Swedish decent” (p. 78):

(5) That person is an S.16

9 Example (1) here is identified as example (3) in Hedger (2012, p. 75), but has been renumbered to avoid confusing the reader with an incoherent numbering method for the multiple examples provided throughout this article.
10 Example (2) here is identified as example (5) in Hedger (2012, p. 76).
11 I am here granting for the sake of argument Hedger’s (2012) use of the expression intelligent as an apt example of an expression with purely descriptive content, but it is perhaps worth further exploring on a separate occasion whether the expression intelligent may also be expressive of an attitude towards the target of predication.
12 Example (3) here is identified as example (5a) in Croom (2011, p. 345).
13 Example (4) here is identified as example (6a) in Croom (2011, p. 345).
14 Finlay (2005) has also aptly pointed out that, “If pejoratives do indeed carry coloring conventionally, it is partly because they exist in the language as alternatives to other words with the same denotations. Why would a speaker call a person a ‘faggot’ rather than homosexual, or a ‘nigger’ rather than a Black or African-American? This choice of terminology is explained by the intention to express contempt towards a group” (p. 19; see also Camp, forthcoming).
15 See Footnote 26 in the present article for an important remark about the speaker pointing in this case. I reserve the remark now for the sake of suspense.
16 Example (5) here is identified as example (17) in Hedger (2012, p. 78).
In (5) Hedger (2012) suggests that “this utterance still manages to be offensive, and that a Swede who felt that the speaker was expressing contempt toward him would not thereby be making a linguistic error” (p. 78). By providing these three key cases for consideration – the first where Hedger (2012) found different translations for English “cuss words” in Spanish, the second where “It would be odd to claim that this person [that yells fucker in frustration] has described the wrench or the car as being a certain way” (p. 77), and the third where “a person of Swedish descent” still manages to be offended by “a slur normally used to target blacks” (p. 78) – Hedger (2012) believes he has thereby provided a compelling case in support of PE’s view that, not only are slurs not purely descriptive, slurs further “lack descriptive content whatsoever” (p. 77) and “contain merely expressive content” (p. 78). In his more recent article “Meaning and Racial Slurs,” Hedger (2013) further clarifies his “pure expressivist line” of thought by explaining how PE holds that slurs such as gook function in the same way as purely expressive expressions such as blasted or ouch. As Hedger (2013) states, “the same point about [the expression blasted] could be made about expressions such as ‘ouch’ or about racial slurs. The main point is that they don’t convey any information beyond the attitude which the speaker expresses by using it” (p. 211).\footnote{Hedger (2012) further suggests that slurs may function as a kind of reverse or anti-honorific (p. 78–79), an interesting view that has already been explored as involving mixed rather than purely expressive content. I urge Hedger to further follow this compulsion (see also Section 3 in Croom, 2014, p. 26).}

Before moving on, let us first acknowledge PE’s potential explanatory merits. For one, by arguing that slurs are expressions with purely expressive rather than purely descriptive content, proponents of PE can explain why the projection behavior of slurs differs markedly from that of expressions with purely descriptive content. By arguing that slurs lack descriptive content whatsoever, Hedger (2012, 2013) can also deny that slurs are ever aptly applied to individuals with certain descriptive features (e.g., that the slur gook ever aptly applies to Koreans) and that sentences involving slurs are ever true (e.g., that claims of the form x is a gook are ever true).\footnote{Hedger (2013) claims that “the semantic content of a slur word is not truth apt, and hence that many statements containing a slur will be neither true nor false” (p. 207).} Hedger (2012) believes that these are important commitments to maintain as non-racists (p. 78) and other scholars before have expressed similar sentiments. For instance, Richard (2008) has previously suggested that speakers using slurs, since “they represent their targets as contemptible because of (for example) their ethnicity or race […] Therefore misrepresent them, as no one is contemptible for that reason” (p. 7). So since Hedger (2012, 2013) follows Richard (2008) in wanting to make clear that no one is contemptible because of their race, Hedger (2012, 2013) argues that slurs (since they presumably express this) always (“misrepresent,” i.e.) fail to represent or pick out their targets, such that the application of a slur in any context “would result in an incomplete predicate on my view, and no clear descriptive content” (Hedger, 2013, p. 207, fn. 8). So perhaps PE is prima facie alluring insofar as it seems capable of allowing one to maintain these commitments and appear non-prejudice. But now that we have reviewed PE and several of Hedger’s (2012, 2013) recent arguments in favor of it, let us next turn to consider several important reasons for why it must ultimately be rejected in favor of a mixed or hybrid approach.

4. Problems for pure expressivism

Although proponents of PE seem to have a solid case in support of their claim that slurs and expressions with purely descriptive content are of distinct types, they have not yet provided a solid case in support of their further claim that expressions with purely expressive content are the only alternative to expressions with purely descriptive content and that slurs must therefore be purely expressive rather than purely descriptive. Surely the possibility of a mixed or hybrid account of slurs is possible, such that slurs are most aptly considered as expressions with both descriptive and expressive elements. In fact, the strict conceptual bifurcation between purely descriptive and purely expressive content has recently been challenged by several scholars that have been productively exploring the viability of mixed or hybrid approaches to the analysis of expressions of various kinds, including slurs and moral expressions (Whiting, 2007, 2013; Boisvert, 2008; Schroeder, 2008; McCready, 2010; Croom, 2010, 2012; Gutzmann, 2011; Hay, 2012).

The purpose of this section is not to review the growing literature on mixed or hybrid approaches to the analysis of various expressions, but rather to offer insight into the reasons why one might be motivated to reject a purely expressive account of slurs in particular and to instead adopt a mixed or hybrid approach. Recall that Hedger (2012), for instance, offered three key cases to consider in favor of PE’s view that slurs lack descriptive content altogether (p. 77–78). The first case to consider was where Hedger (2012) found different translations for English “cuss words” in Spanish (p. 77). He argued that, since “different dictionaries would give very different English expressions as translations” for these “cuss words,” it is plausible to thereby assume that “a vast number of derogatory expressions (particularly those considered most offensive) don’t obviously differ in meaning” (Hedger, 2012, p. 77). Thus, in the first case Hedger (2012) offers us in support of PE, he takes an analysis of “cuss words” that suggests different “cuss words” “don’t obviously differ in meaning” and assumes that from this analysis a conclusion about “slurs” can be straightforwardly drawn, namely, that different “slurs” don’t obviously differ in
meaning either. And by “meaning” here Hedger (2012) means descriptive content,\footnote{Descriptive, truth-conditional content is also often referred to in the literature as “at-issue” content (e.g., Potts, 2005, p. 6; Potts, 2012, p. 2516).} since he uses this case to argue that slurs lack descriptive content altogether (p. 77; see also Hedger, 2013, p. 206).

What is problematic about this case that Hedger (2012) offers in support of PE is that he treat “cuss words” like fucker as equivalent to “slurs” like nigger and illegitimately draws conclusions about “slurs” from an analysis of “cuss words.” Just as prior proponents of PE have considered expressions like fucker and expressions like nigger as both similar examples of “expressives” (Kaplan, 1999; Kratzer, 1999; Potts, 2003, 2005, 2007; Potts and Kawahara, 2004; Pullum and Rawlins, 2007; Potts et al., 2009),\footnote{Linguistic items that have been identified in the literature as belonging to the class of “expressives” include, for instance, “expressive attributive adjectives” such as damn (Potts, 2005, p. 6), “epithets” such as nigger (Potts, 2007, p. 181) and idiot (Potts, 2005, p. 6), “honorifics” such as professor (Potts, 2005, p. 6; for Korean honorifics see Kim and Sells, 2007), “antihonorifics” such as yagaru in Japanese (Potts and Kawahara, 2004, p. 267), and “certain interjections” such as ouch (Potts and Kawahara, 2004, p. 254).} Hedger (2012) likewise considers expressions like fucker and expressions like nigger as both similar examples of “epithets” (p. 74, 76–77). But this move by proponents of PE is highly suspect because “cuss words” like fucker function in a way that is linguistically quite distinct from “slurs” like nigger and the two must accordingly be treated as distinct types of expressions. This point has become increasingly acknowledged recently, with Hom (2010, 2012) and Whiting (2013) holding that fucker is a “swear word” whereas nigger is a “slur,” with Croom (2011, 2013) and Gutzmann (2011) holding that fucker is a “pure expressive” whereas nigger is a “slur.” Regardless of the somewhat distracting use of different terminology across recent scholarship on slurs, the general point remains that there are sufficiently important differences between expressions like fucker and those like nigger such that the two must be treated distinctly. For the sake of clarity on this point, let us briefly review how expressions with purely expressive content like fucker differ markedly from expressions with purely descriptive content like Korean American. Then we can turn to more clearly inspect how slurs are distinct from both purely expressive and purely descriptive expressions.

Consider the following examples below, with purely expressive and purely descriptive expressions in predicate position ((6a) and (7a), respectively) and NP position ((6c) and (7c), respectively):

\[(\text{6a}) \quad \text{T is a fucker, but I deny saying anything about his } [x] \dagger.\]

\[(\text{7a}) \quad \text{T is a Korean American, but I deny saying anything about his } [x] \dagger.\]

\[(\text{6c}) \quad \text{That fucker is my colleague, but I deny saying anything about his } [x] \dagger.\]

\[(\text{7c}) \quad \text{That Korean American is my colleague, but I deny saying anything about his } [x] \dagger.\]

Let \([x] \dagger\) represent a variable that admits only of expressions with purely descriptive content. Substituting expressions with purely descriptive content for \([x] \dagger\) in the examples above shows that the substitution of certain purely descriptive contents blocks the felicity of purely descriptive cases (7a) and (7c), but does not block the felicity of purely expressive cases (6a) and (6c). This is suggested in the examples involving substitutions below:

\[(\text{6b}) \quad \text{T is a fucker, but I deny saying anything about his [racial identity].}\]

\[(\text{7b}) \quad \text{T is a Korean American, but I deny saying anything about his [racial identity].}\]

\[(\text{6d}) \quad \text{That fucker is my colleague, but I deny saying anything about his [racial identity].}\]

\[(\text{7d}) \quad \text{That Korean American is my colleague, but I deny saying anything about his [racial identity].}\]

The idea is that since the particular descriptive features of the target T are inessential to the speaker indicating their own emotional state, in purely expressive cases (6b) and (6d) the speaker can felicitously call a target a fucker while denying that their utterance has anything to do with certain (e.g. racial) descriptive features of that target at all. That is, since purely expressive expressions work primarily to indicate the emotional state of the speaker, they can be felicitously uttered regardless of there being a target with certain (e.g. racial) descriptive features at all (Potts, 2005, 2007).

Although proponents of PE seem right to consider expressions like fucker as purely expressive, they are quite wrong to consider expressions like gook as purely expressive also. For even if we grant that fucker is purely expressive, the slur gook clearly is not. This is indicated below:

\[(\text{6a}) \quad \text{T is a fucker, but I deny saying anything about his } [x] \dagger.\]

\[(\text{7a}) \quad \text{T is a Korean American, but I deny saying anything about his } [x] \dagger.\]

\[(\text{8a}) \quad \text{T is a gook, but I deny saying anything about his } [x] \dagger.\]

\[(\text{6b}) \quad \text{T is a fucker, but I deny saying anything about his [racial identity].}\]

\[(\text{7b}) \quad \text{T is a Korean American, but I deny saying anything about his [racial identity].}\]

\[(\text{8b}) \quad \text{T is a gook, but I deny saying anything about his [racial identity].}\]
Notice from the examples above that whereas the purely expressive case (6b) is felicitous on the grounds that expressions with purely expressive content do not target or pick out certain specific descriptive features (such as racial identity) and can therefore be felicitously uttered while denying some particular set of descriptive features (such as racial identity) to its target, the slurring case (8b) is not likewise felicitous. At least in this respect, the slurring case (8b) is not like the purely expressive case (6b), but is instead rather like the purely descriptive case (7b). This point is not specific to racial slurs but is a general point applying to others such as sexual slurs. Consider the following examples:

(9a) T is a fucker, but I deny saying anything about her \(x\)\(^d\).
(10a) T is a woman, but I deny saying anything about her \(x\)\(^d\).
(11a) T is a slut, but I deny saying anything about her \(x\)\(^d\).

(9b) T is a fucker, but I deny saying anything about her [sexual identity].
(10b) T is a woman, but I deny saying anything about her [sexual identity].
(11b) T is a slut, but I deny saying anything about her [sexual identity].

It is suggested from these examples that whereas the purely expressive case (9b) is felicitous on the grounds that expressions with purely expressive content do not target or pick out certain specific descriptive features (such as sexual identity) and can therefore be felicitously uttered while denying some particular set of descriptive features (such as sexual identity) to its target, the slurring case (11b) is not likewise felicitous. At least in this respect, the slurring case (11b) is not like the purely expressive case (12b), but is instead rather like the purely descriptive case (10b).

This result is unsurprising, for slurs are usually understood to target those descriptive features typically considered to be associated with members belonging to certain classes:\(^{21}\): gook typically slurs Korean Americans, nigger typically slurs African Americans, chink typically slurs Chinese Americans, and so on. As Anderson and Lepore (2013) rightly point out, there in fact exists a large variety of slurs “that target groups on the basis of race (‘nigger’), nationality (‘kraut’), religion (‘kike’), gender (‘bitch’), sexual orientation (‘fag’), immigrant status (‘wetback’) and sundry other demographics” (p. 25). But as we have now seen, purely expressive expressions like fucker do not target group members on the basis of race, nationality, religion, gender, sexual orientation, immigrant status, or other such sundry demographic features. In other words, whereas it is generally held that purely expressive expressions like fucker and damn do not differ in their descriptive content (Potts, 2005, 2007),\(^{22}\) it seems rather clear that slurs like gook and slut are in fact distinguished from one another by virtue of (differences among) their descriptive content.

Let us further consider the very different ways in which racial and sexual slurs have actually been used and are commonly understood. With regards to racial slurs, for instance, Easton (2007) writes that the racial slur nigger was understood to be “an opprobrious term, employed to impose contempt upon blacks as an inferior race” (p. 41–42) while Blassingame (1979) famously noted in The Slave Community that “to relieve themselves of the anxiety of thinking about slaves as men […] whites of all classes came to rely on language (and especially the use of pejoratives like the N word) in the pursuit of such relief” (p. 14). Rahman (2012) likewise suggests that “the racist use of nigger criticizes a presumed innate moral and intellectual inferiority of African Americans” (p. 158) and that “nigger became a convenient term for indexing the subhuman characteristics being ascribed to African Americans through this ideology” (p. 143). With regards to sexual slurs, on the other hand, Attwood (2007) discusses how the sexual slur slut has been variously defined as a “vulgar promiscuous woman who flouts propriety” (p. 233) or “a woman of a low or loose character” (p. 234), while Blackwell (2004) writes that “The word “slut,” a charge easy to level and hard to disprove, is an ambivalent emblem of women’s perception of their sexuality” (p. 141). By considering the very different ways in which the racial slur nigger and sexual slur slut have actually been used and are commonly understood, it becomes especially clear that an application of a particular slur in context does not occur at random, but instead based on considerations of their systematic differential application-conditions, which concern descriptive features of targets such as their racial or sexual identity. In other words, what makes a racial slur or a sexual slur is determined by the content of \(r\), just as what makes a sexual slur or a sexual slur is determined by the content of \(s\) (Himma, 2002; Hom, 2008). This point can be clarified with the examples below:

(12a) T is a slut, but I deny saying anything about her \(x\)\(^d\).
(13a) T is a gook, but I deny saying anything about her \(x\)\(^d\).

(12c) T is a slut, but I deny saying anything about her [racial identity].
(13c) T is a gook, but I deny saying anything about her [racial identity].

(12d) T is a slut, but I deny saying anything about her [sexual identity].
(13d) T is a gook, but I deny saying anything about her [sexual identity].

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\(^{21}\) Croom (2011, 2013) offers discussion on the role that the stereotype associated with a particular slur plays and how the descriptive features involved in that stereotype contribute to the predication of certain content in the application of a slur towards its target in context (see also Miscivc, 2011). An explicit outline of how this works was originally presented in Croom, 2011 (p. 355–357), and was subsequently expanded in Croom, 2013 (p. 196–200).

\(^{22}\) This is because the expressions fucker and damn are commonly thought of as lacking descriptive content altogether (Potts, 2005, 2007).
Although the sexual case (12a) and the racial case (13a) both involve utterances the felicity of which are blockable by some descriptive content, it is evident from these examples that they are not both blockable by the same descriptive content. That is to say, that content which blocks the felicity of the sexual slur in (12d) does not block the felicity of the racial slur in (13d), and that content which blocks the felicity of the racial slur in (13c) does not block the felicity of the sexual slur in (12c). Resultantly, since slurs are distinguishable from one another by virtue of their descriptive conditions, it follows that slurs must have descriptive contents (see also Croom, 2011, p. 347–348; Croom, 2013, p. 178–182). Further, these contents must possess sufficient differences among their varieties such that they can be aptly distinguished from one another by competent speakers. Resultantly, it is perfectly clear that, contrary to the claims of PE, slurs are not purely expressive but have a descriptive element also.

The second case Hedger (2012) offered in support of PE was where he argued that “It would be odd to claim that this person [that yells fucker in frustration] has described the wrench or the car as being a certain way” (p. 77). But here Hedger (2012) has again taken an analysis of “cuss words” that suggests that “cuss words” fail to describe targets (p. 77) and assumed that from this analysis a conclusion about “slurs” can be straightforwardly drawn, namely, that “slurs” fail to describe targets as being a certain way also. What is problematic here is similar to what was problematic about the first case just discussed, namely, Hedger (2012) treats “cuss words” like fucker as equivalent to “slurs” like nigger and illegitimately draws conclusions about “slurs” from an analysis of “cuss words.” But as we have already seen in response to the first case for PE, “cuss words” like fucker function in a way that is linguistically quite distinct from “slurs” like nigger and the two must accordingly be treated as distinct types of expressions. So although it is widely acknowledged that expression like fucker lack descriptive content and are purely expressive instead, it can nonetheless still be denied that expressions like nigger lack descriptive content and are purely expressive also (e.g., Hom, 2010, 2012; Croom, 2011, 2013; Miscevic, 2011; Whiting, 2013; Hay, 2012).

This point can be further reinforced by considering who might reasonably be offended by a particular slur. For instance, if expressions such as fucker and nigger are really expressions of the same type, as PE holds, and no one in particular tends to feel especially targeted by an expression such as fucker, then it should follow that no one in particular tends to feel especially targeted by an expression such as nigger either. But it seems clearly false that no one in particular tends to feel especially targeted by an expression such as nigger (for instance, see Leung, 2004; Jackson, 2005; McLaughlin, 2008; Islam, 2011; Stamper, 2011). So with respect to this point, PE seems committed to a claim that is empirically false. Furthermore, PE also seems committed to the related normative commitment that no one in particular should feel especially targeted by an expression such as nigger, since the slur “lack[s] descriptive content whatsoever” (Hedger, 2012, p. 77) and is instead purely expressive of the state of the speaker (Hedger, 2012; see also Potts, 2003; Potts and Kawahara, 2004; Hedger, 2013). So PE seems committed to the claim that, if anyone in particular were to feel especially targeted by a particular slurring expression such as nigger, then they would be feeling offended unreasonably. For example, if an African American were to feel especially targeted by the slur nigger, say more so than a Swedish person (Hedger, 2012, p. 78), then according to PE that African American must be feeling especially targeted unreasonably since an African American should feel no more targeted by the slur nigger than by the purely expressive expressions blasted or oouch (Hedger, 2013, p. 211). Yet this apparent commitment of PE itself seems unreasonable, as it fails to take seriously, for instance, the history and nature of particularly race-directed offense (for further discussion on specifically race-directed offense see Fredrickson, 1971; Blassingame, 1979; Bonnell, 1998; Sneiderman and Piazza, 2002; Asim, 2007; Smith, 2011; Croom, 2013; Abd-Santos, 2013; Benen, 2013; Cole, 2013; Eccher and Mohr, 2013; Gee, 2013; McLaughlin, 2008; Tracy, Wells and Schapiro, 2013; Washington, 2013; Weisman, 2013; Zimmerman, 2013).

The third case Hedger (2012) offered in support of PE was where he argued that “a person of Swedish descent” still manages to be offended by “a slur normally used to target blacks” (p. 78). The idea Hedger (2012) has here in support of PE seems to be that, since it is not only African Americans that find the slur nigger offensive, but presumably Swedish people and others also, then slurs such as nigger are generally offensive expressions with respect to everyone. And since each particular slur is presumably such that that slur is generally offensive with respect to everyone, then each slur must be generally and purely expressive, lacking sufficient descriptive content that might figure into the felicitous ascription of particular slurs towards particular targets in context. As Hedger claims, the sentence Obama is the first S President of the U.S., “when S is a slur normally used to target blacks,” “fails to offer sufficient descriptive content to predicate anything of Obama” (2012, p. 78) and that “Slurs express contempt but don’t say anything about or describe their targets, and thus are composed of purely expressive content” (2013, p. 206).

23 Admittedly, I am not fond of the expression “content,” as it might mislead one into thinking that words somehow contained within themselves instructions for their systematic differential application, but I use the expression here to keep the present discussion as relevant to the extant literature as possible. To wear my heart on my sleeve, I am rather with Wittgenstein (1982) when he says, “The rules do not follow from the idea. They are not got by analysis of the idea; they constitute it. They show the use of the word” (p. 186).

24 Indeed, Hedger (2012) seems to implicitly if not explicitly accept this, since he seems to have no problem identifying which slur is to count as the relevant S, “when S is a slur normally used to target blacks” (p. 78). For further discussion see Croom (2014, p. 19).

25 As well as the history and nature of particularly sex-directed offense, etc. (for further discussion on specifically sex-directed offense see Buzinski, 2013; Canadian Press, 2013; Channel 3000, 2013; Cruz, 2013; Huey, 2013; Islam, 2011; Jones, 2011; Vyas and Minaya, 2013).

26 It should be perfectly clear that in this case that Hedger (2012) considers the real referential work towards the Swedish person is being done by the speaker’s pointing rather than their lexical choice. Hedger (2012) fails to appreciate this important point in his example. (for further discussion see Section 3 of Croom, 2014, p. 21)
But what is problematic with Hedger’s (2012) purely expressive analysis of this case is that he conflates being the target of a potentially offensive act with being the witness of a potentially offensive act. A Swedish person that is offended by the use of the slur nigger can still take offense as a witness of this linguistic act while not taking offense as the target of this linguistic act. For instance, even if you are not Korean American, because you are presumably not racist you are still likely to find the slur gook offensive as a witness. But given whatever racial or sexual identity you happen to have, you are likely to further find some particular slur particularly offensive as a target. For instance, if you are Korean American you are likely to find the slur gook – but not the slur boche – particularly offensive as a target. Although PE may be able to offer an account for the general offensiveness of slurs for non-targeted witnesses, it seems ill-equipped to account for how slurs have the capacity for particularly targeted offensiveness. For if it were true that all slurs “lack descriptive content whatsoever” (Hedger, 2012, p. 77) and “that slurs contain merely expressive content” (Hedger, 2012, p. 78), as PE holds, then it would remain ultimately mysterious why in certain contexts a (for instance, racist or in-group) speaker would find the slur gook more linguistically apt than the slur boche for targeting Korean Americans, and why Korean Americans would presumably feel more directly offended by the slur gook than by the slur boche. We could call these two problems for PE the challenge of lexical aptness and the challenge of target aptness, respectively. That is to say, by arguing for the view that slurs like nigger function as purely expressive expressions like ouch to convey no information beyond the subjective state of the speaker (Hedger, 2013, p. 211), PE seems unable to explain why in certain contexts a speaker would find one slur more linguistically apt than another for use (lexical aptness) or why in certain contexts some targets would find one slur more directly offensive than another (target aptness). Both challenges, although conceptually distinct, result from the fact that both speakers and targets that are competent in the language in which the slur is employed are largely familiar with slurring expressions and their systematic differential application-conditions, which concern descriptive features of targets such as their racial or sexual identity.

Further, PE seems not only to fail at explaining why in certain contexts a speaker would find one slur more linguistically apt than another for use (lexical aptness) and why in certain contexts some targets would find one slur more directly offensive than another (target aptness), PE also seems unable to account for the basic fact that the use of a slur does not always or necessarily express offense. Because Hedger (2012, 2013) argues that slurs contain purely offensive expressive content – as Hedger (2013) proposes, “the offensiveness of racial slurs should be considered part of their semantic content” (p. 206) – he remains committed to the view that slurs are always and necessarily offensive. As Hedger (2013) clearly states, “A slur can’t be uttered without saying something derogatory” and “Slurs are offensive in every use, no matter the context of conversation” (p. 207, my emphasis). Further, in the example statement Obama is an S, when S is a slur normally used to target blacks, Hedger (2013) claims that “there is no way to characterize the speaker’s belief content which does not contain an expression of contempt or in a way which is not offensive” (p. 208, my emphasis).

Now, to be clear, what I am not denying here is the view that uses of slurs are highly offensive to most people most of the time. What I am denying is merely the much stronger view that uses of slurs are always and necessarily offensive. Being able to account for the basic fact that slurs can be felicitously used in a way that is non-offensive is crucially important for an explanatorily adequate account of slurs,27 since several scholars have recently called attention to the fact that slurs are not always or exclusively used to derogate.28 For instance, several scholars have noted that the slur nigger has been used non-pejoratively since at least the early 1800s (Dillard, 1977; Stuckey, 1994; Spears, 1998; Jacobs, 2001; Wilson, 2002; Rahman, 2012), and that slurs are in fact frequently picked up and reappropriated by the very in-group members that the slur was originally intended to target, presumably as a means for like speakers to strengthen in-group solidarity or to diminish what derogatory force the slur had previously carried (Aldridge, 2001; Kennedy, 2002; Brontsema, 2004; Croom, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013; Galinksy et al., 2013). This reappropriative use of slurs, which Croom (2013) calls the non-derogatory in-group use of slurs, is a bone fide and widespread use of slurs that communicates positive, non-pejorative content or meaning when employed between in-group speakers that differs markedly from the “Pejorative meanings that have historically come from outside the community” (Rahman, 2012, p. 141).

Although a few scholars have briefly touched upon the phenomena of reappropriation in their analysis of slurs (e.g., Brontsema, 2004, p. 1–16; Saka, 2007, p. 146; Hom, 2008, p. 428; Richard, 2008, p. 9; Croom, 2008, p. 43–45; Croom, 2011, p. 349–350; Anderson and Lepore, 2013, p. 41–43; Croom, 2013, p. 190–194), the topic of reappropriation has largely been neglected and often considered tangential to an adequate account (e.g., Hedger, 2012, p. 74–75, 2013, p. 206). But by failing to carefully consider the in-group use of slurs one is left with only a partial and impoverished picture of the full functional capacity of slurs in natural language and social life, while continuing to ignore any possible evidence that might count against the claim that the use of a slur always and necessarily expresses offense. When proponents of PE such as Hedger (2012, 2013) continue to ignore the in-group use of slurs, they further fail to consider as worthy of reflection the distinctive perspectives and linguistic practices of in-group (typically minority) speakers, brushing them off to the side as atypical, tangential, or not in accord with “common sense” (Hedger, 2012, p. 83, 2013). But Hedger’s (2012) a priori intuitions about what constitutes “common sense” seem to be based on little more than a priori prejudice masquerading as unquestionable philosophical intuition. For instance, Hedger (2013) simply assumes a priori that slurs are offensive in every use and across all contexts (p. 207) and that characterizing the speaker’s belief content involving a slurring expression necessarily requires

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27 See adequacy condition 4 of 6 in Croom (2011, p. 355), and adequacy conditions 6 and 7 of 7 in Croom (2013, p. 200).

28 Even Harris and Potts (2009) acknowledge this, claiming that “while epithets do not convey an exclusively negative emotion relation between the referent and the attitude holder, we did not detect any interpretations in our items in which a positive emotional stance was supported in the context provided” (p. 536, fn. 10).

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an expression of contempt or offense (p. 208). But instead of simply assuming a priori, as Hedger has, that slurs always and necessarily work in just one way (i.e., to express offense), let us rather look and see how slurs are in fact used across a diverse range of linguistic contexts. In this respect, perhaps Wittgenstein (1953) offered productive advice to those getting all-too-comfortable in the armchair when he says, “Don’t think, but look!” (§66). So let us next look and see.

5. Empirical considerations on the non-derogatory use of slurs

Now, the fact that the same expression can be understood differently by different group members or in different contexts might serve as a surprise to some, but it should nonetheless be recognized that even the communication of Campbell’s monkeys has been shown to be context-specific where “Context could be described in terms of event type, degree of threat, spatial relations within the group, and group movements” (Quattara et al., 2009a, p. 5) – and that the same call can be interpreted differently by different group members or in different contexts. For instance, in “Monkey Semantics: Towards a Formal Analysis of Primate Alarm Calls,” Schlenker (2013) makes this point nicely with empirical data on Campbell’s monkeys from the Tai Forest and Tiwai Island, which suggests that “the same alarm call is interpreted differently in the two communities” (p. 1, original emphasis; see also Quattara et al., 2009b). I mention this example here merely as a way to remind one of the genuine possibility that the same communicative signal may in fact be used and interpreted differently in different social contexts in human and nonhuman communication alike, and that the context of communication is of crucial importance not just for monkey communication but for human communication also. In light of this general fact that the same signal or expression may be used and interpreted differently among communicators in different social contexts, perhaps instances of this occurring with slurring expressions in particular may be viewed with less mystery.

Consider for example a recent report on CBS Sports, where Wilson (2013) discussed how Louis Delmas and Tony Scheffler, close friends and fellow Lions teammates, casually exchange slurs with one another and mutually understand that in these contexts their use of “racial slurs are considered a term of endearment” rather than a term of derogation (see also Foster, 2013; Smith, 2013; Croom, 2014, p. 23). The influential hip-hop lyricist Talib Kweli also reports about the slur nigger that, “Our community has been using the word and trying to redefine the context of it for a long time” and “the fact of the matter is that there’s a large segment of black people who grew up hearing the word intended as nothing but love” (quoted in Echegoyen, 2006). In Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word, Kennedy (2002) also claims that many African Americans continue to non-offensively use the slur “openly and frequently in conversations with one another” (p. 37) and Spears (1998) likewise claims that “the great majority of African Americans, male and female, use [the] N [word] when among other African Americans” non-offensively (p. 239). Henry Louis Gates, Jr., a professor and director of the W.E.B. Du Bois Institute for African American Research at Harvard University, also claims that he is not at all offended by the use of the slur in an in-group context among African Americans (Gates, 2009). Russell Simmons, the founder of Def Jam Records, further explains that:

When we say ‘nigger’ now, it’s very positive. Now all white kids who buy into hip-hop culture call each other ‘nigger’ because they have no history with the word other than something positive [...] When black kids call each other ‘a real nigger’ or ‘my nigger,’ it means you walk a certain way […] have your own culture that you invent so you don’t have to buy into the US culture that you’re not really a part of. It means we’re special. We have our own language.

(quoted in Jackson, 2005)

Other prominent African American entertainers, such as Richard Pryor (Jackson, 2005), Nas (McLaughlin, 2008), Dave Chappelle (Leung, 2004), Ice Cube, and 50 Cent have also stated that their use of slurs were not intended nor typically understood as offensive (Croom, 2011, p. 350).

It is also evident that the non-derogatory in-group use of slurs is not restricted to racial slurs alone, but also extends to slurs of other kinds such as sexual slurs.31 For instance, sexual slurs such as slut and bitch have also been popularly reappropriated for in-group use (Kleinman et al., 2009; Schillinger, 2010; Angyal, 2011). Stampler (2011) for one has noted that “the word “queer” [serves] as an example of a[nother] word that was once strictly pejorative but is now a common sexual identifier used [non-offensively] by the LGBT community.” The representatives of SlutWalk, an influential movement including thousands of individuals, expressed their perspective concerning slurs over a radio broadcast in the following way:

(...)

29 Relatively little work has been done on the reappropriative or non-derogatory in-group use of slurs, so in this article we will largely focus on examples from which we can draw the most empirically informed insight.

30 Interestingly, the literature on the communication of Campbell’s monkeys has shown that they can use affixation to alter call meaning (Quattara et al., 2009b), and Croom (2013) has recently argued for a similar (although not identical) point about human communication by suggesting that speakers may strategically employ phonological or other linguistic features characteristic of their in-group to strategically signal their in-group status. For instance, Croom (2013) provides the following example of how this works:

* Nigger + feature 5 of AAVE(r-less-ness) = Niggo.

31 Relatively more derogatory → relatively less derogatory (p. 193). It is also evident that the non-derogatory in-group use of slurs is not restricted to English slurs alone, but also extends to slurs in other languages, such as Spanish. For instance, it has been pointed out that “guachos is a common epithet [or slur] in Argentina that can be used disparagingly or admiringly” (Ratliff, 2008, p. 199–200).
One of the most effective ways to fight hate is to disarm the derogatory terms employed by haters, embracing them and giving them positive connotations. This also serves to provide a sex-positive term for women (and men), few or none of which currently exist, and allows sluts (individuals of any gender who have and enjoy frequent consensual sex, especially with multiple partners) to identify as part of a cohesive group for political representation. We feel that offering a place for women who lead such a lifestyle to self-identify as sluts does not disrespect them – indeed, the disrespecting is done by the rapists, the victim-blamers who excuse the rape, and the slut-shamers who say or imply they are disgracing, degrading, and dishonoring themselves.

(Murray et al., 2011)

Jarvis, the founder of SlutWalk, explains that, “I come from a frame of mind that language is powerful, and [that] you can also change language […] An aim of the SlutWalk movement is to reappropriate the word “slut”’’ (quoted in Stampler, 2011; see also Brison, 2011; Jones, 2011; Martin, 2011; Murray et al., 2011). Likewise, Ice Cube says his use of the racial slur nigger serves as a defiant “badge of honor” while Richard Pryor says that he “decided to make it my own. Nigger. I decided to take the sting out of it” (quoted in Jackson, 2005).

Empirical research in sociological and cultural studies has also helped to shed light on this issue by suggesting that the non-derogatory in-group use of slurs is especially prevalent in communities highly influenced by what have been considered “counterculture” norms (i.e., norms adopted in opposition to, and for the purpose of subverting, other entrenched sociocultural norms that a group contests). For instance, Cutler (2007) has pointed out that within hip-hop culture, “Whiteness is still marked against a backdrop of normative Blackness” (p. 10–11; see also Boyd, 2002; Alim, 2006; Lee, 2009a, 2009b; Cutler, 2003, 2009). Reasons for this form of normative reversal – from what Cutler (2009) considers a backdrop of normative Whiteness to a backdrop of normative Blackness – can be gleaned from a passage in Anderson’s (1999) *Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City*:

[In the inner city,] the despair, the alienation, and the distress are still there, and this condition encourages the development and spread of the oppositional culture […] In this scenario, anything associated with conventional white society is seen as square; the hip things are at odds with it. The untied sneakers, the pants worn well below the waist, the hat turned backward – all have become a style. These unconventional symbols have been taken over by people who have made them into status symbols, but they are status symbols to the extent that they go against what is conventional […] people embracing the oppositional culture] take heart from professional athletes who confront the system and stand up for themselves. In their view, policemen, public officials, and corporate heads are unworthy of respect and hold little moral authority […] A counterculture thus emerges, with the purpose of making a cultural statement against a dominate society that many young inner-city blacks feel disrespects them. (p. 112, 36, 234)

As Anderson (1999) explains, because many inner-city residents feel that the wider system has abandoned them and disrespects them, they often find it important to distinguish their appearance and behavior with a marked unconventionality, often influenced by the oppositional norms of the inner city culture (Anderson, 1999). Inner-city residents that find it important to distinguish their appearance and behavior with a marked unconventionality will also often find it important to distinguish their speech styles and strategies also. In “How to Do Things with Slurs: Studies in the Way of Derogatory Words,” Croom (2013) has recently suggested that one such strategy involves subverting derogation through linguistic reappropriation such that between in-group speakers the slur is used as a norm reversed variant of the original paradigmatic derogatory use, and thus understood between in-group speakers as non-derogatory (p. 191).22 In other words, where S represents a slur and its positive (+) or negative (–) superscript value represents the derogatory value of the slur in context, we can represent the slur in its paradigmatic derogatory use as $S^-$. But Croom (2011, 2013) suggests that in the context of in-group speakers the slur can be used as a norm reversed variant of the original paradigmatic derogatory use ($S^+$) and thus be understood between in-group speakers as non-derogatory, which can be represented instead as $S^-$. Given the interesting way in which reappropriation works and the lack of scholarly attention it has received before, it is perhaps unsurprising that philosophers, linguists, and psychologists alike have started paying it more careful attention. For instance, in a recent article in *Psychological Science* entitled “The Reappropriation of Stigmatizing Labels: The Reciprocal Relationship Between Power and Self-Labeling,” Galinsky et al. (2013) conducted ten empirical studies on reappropriation to test its potential effects on speakers and listeners empirically (also see discussion in Galinsky et al., 2003). Interestingly enough, their results suggested that a reciprocal relationship holds between (a) the feeling or sense of power, and (b) self-labeling with a slur such as queer or bitch. As they report the main results from the ten empirical studies they conducted:

Self-labelers felt more powerful after self-labeling and observers perceived self-labelers and their group as more powerful. Finally, the label was evaluated less negatively after self-labeling and this stigma attenuation was mediated by perceived power. Importantly, these effects only occurred for derogatory terms (e.g., queer, bitch) but not for descriptive (e.g., LGBT, woman) or majority group labels (e.g., straight). These results suggest that self-labeling with a derogatory label can weaken its stigmatizing force.

(Galinsky et al., 2013, p. 1)

22 A general framework for how slurs may be differentially used by in-group and out-group speakers was introduced in “Slurs” (Croom, 2011) and subsequently expanded in “How to Do Things with Slurs: Studies in the Way of Derogatory Words” (Croom, 2013), so the reader is referred to those works for further discussion.
In accord with Croom's (2011, 2013) suggestion and contrary to Hedger (2012, 2013), these ten empirical studies suggest that in certain in-group contexts – for surely self-labelers stand in an in-group relationship with themselves – the slur is not aptly considered as S* but rather as S instead. So recent empirical studies in fact corroborate other independent reports of in-group speakers claiming to use slurs non-offensively, and provide a serious challenge for proponents of PE such as Hedger (2013) that argue a priori that “Slurs are offensive in every use, no matter the context of conversation” (p. 207). Further, by considering evidence of this kind, it seems clear that careful consideration of the reappropriative or non-derogatory in-group use of slurs is not tangential to an account of slurs at all (contra to Hedger, 2012, p. 74–75; Hedger, 2013, p. 206), but may in fact offer us crucial insight into the dynamics of the derogatory force behind slurs as well as how derogation may be actively and linguistically subverted by those that have been prejudicially targeted. In other words, the fact that slurs, employed in an in-group context, can act to diminish what derogatory force the slur had previously carried may offer us crucial insight into how slurs can shift in grade of value from relatively more derogatory (S*) to relatively less derogatory (S) or from relatively less derogatory (S) to relatively more derogatory (S*'). Moreover, careful consideration of the reappropriative or non-derogatory in-group use of slurs may also offer us crucial insight into how different slurs can carry differing degrees of force at the same time (i.e., synchronic variation in force between different slurs at time t) as well as how the same slur can carry differing degrees of force at different times (i.e., diachronic variation in force between a slur at time t and at time t + n). Again, recall that the salient ability of slurs to offend has been a central point of focus in prior work on slurs (e.g., Anderson and Lepore, 2013, p. 25; Hedger, 2012, p. 74), and it is arguably the case that properly understanding the dynamics of how this works involves properly understanding how the derogatory force of slurs can be both increased and decreased or both strengthened and weakened. Only by acknowledging this point can progress be made in accounting for the full range of empirical data on slurs, especially those involving their non-derogatory in-group use.

Although Hedger (2013) has acknowledged that, for instance, “Christopher Hom (2008) purports to give some examples of non-derogatory uses of slurs,” Hedger (2013) immediately goes on to reject Hom’s (2008) examples by claiming that “I have yet to find a single informant who sides with Hom (2008) on this issue” (p. 209). But given the fact that in this short section alone we have reviewed a substantial population of competent speakers explicitly claim to use slurs non-offensively (including, for instance, Talib Kweli, Randall Kennedy, Arthur Spears, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Russell Simmons, Richard Pryor, Nas, Dave Chappelle, Ice Cube, 50 Cent, Louis Delmas, Tony Scheffler, and 54% of 1355 participants in an Associated Press-MTV study), it seems clear that if Hedger (2013) has not yet found his “informant” it is perhaps because he has not been listening to a diverse enough range of competent speakers.

For despite the fact that Talib Kweli explains how “the fact of the matter is that there’s a large segment of black people who grew up hearing the [slur] word intended as nothing but love” (quoted in Echegoyen, 2006), Hedger (2013) must nonetheless insist on denying the truth of this since PE holds that “Slurs express contempt regardless of the attitude or particular use of the speaker” and that “there is no way to characterize the speaker’s belief content [involving the slur] which does not contain an expression of contempt or in a way which is not offensive” (p. 209, 208). And despite the fact that members of SlutWalk, a global movement including thousands of individuals, have explained how they aim at “embracing them [slurs] within their own circle of friends” and that in such contexts the slur is non-offensive (Cass and Agiesta, 2011; Greene, 2011). And in another empirical study conducted by Rahman (2012) one of the subjects explains “You see, the people who say they’re offended are the older adults. Young kids don’t understand what the big deal is about the word. They know it’s about black people and slavery, but they’re like ‘that’s over’” (p. 161).

In Hom’s (2008) influential account, “derogatory variation” is considered as adequacy condition 2 of 6 for slurs (p. 426) and “evolution” is considered as adequacy condition 6 of 6 for slurs (p. 427). Thus the present point can be seen as motivating attention back to these very interesting adequacy conditions that Hom (2008) rightly considers (for discussion of expressions and their “evolution” see e.g. Aldridge et al., 2001; Heffernan, 2005). A purely expressive account of slurs committed to the claim that all slurs simply and purely express contempt as their content, on the other hand, seems to have little to contribute with regards to furthering discussion on these important points.

Although on the face of it Hedger (2012, 2013) appears to be championing a non-prejudicial view of how slurs operate in natural language, it is clear that he has made no attempt whatsoever to actually take into consideration their natural language use among the substantial population of African Americans and women that we have discussed herein (along with

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33 In another empirical study conducted by Associated Press-MTV involving 1355 participants, it was also found that 54% of respondents “think it’s OK to use them [slurs] within their own circle of friends” and that in such contexts the slur is non-offensive (Cass and Agiesta, 2011; Greene, 2011). And in another empirical study conducted by Rahman (2012) one of the subjects explains “You see, the people who say they’re offended are the older adults. Young kids don’t understand what the big deal is about the word. They know it’s about black people and slavery, but they’re like ‘that’s over’” (p. 161).

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other targeted minority groups). Thus, PE’s blanket claims to the effect that slurs always and necessarily express offense have unfortunately come at the expense of excluding as worthy of consideration the linguistic behavior and explicit reports of the very in-group speakers that PE presumably aims to defend. Such a priori exclusion does not strike one as genuinely working against prejudice but rather as silently (though presumably unknowingly) perpetuating it. Prejudice does not stop at what we say (e.g., McLaughlin, 2008), and I think that to genuinely work against prejudice scholars must further show that they consider the linguistic behavior of prejudicially targeted speakers to be just as worthy of scholarly attention – and that their linguistic behavior is just as important to consider for a fully adequate account of slurs – as the linguistic behavior of upper class, majority, and prejudicially non-targeted speakers.

To be clear, my aim here is not to argue that slurs are never offensive, for clearly slurs are often terribly offensive when used in many contexts. What I am arguing here, however, is that slurs need not always and necessarily be offensive, even if the range of non-offensive applications is restricted to use between certain in-group members alone. As Dave Chappelle reported in an interview, although he would “be furious” in response to a white user using the racial slur nigger, when he uses that slur as an African American “it feels more like an act of freedom [than oppression]” (Leung, 2004). In other words, just because Hedger and I may be restricted from using the slur nigger non-offensively in conversation with African Americans, that does not entail a blanket restriction on the non-offensive use of that slur such that African Americans are also thereby restricted from using the slur nigger non-offensively in conversation with African Americans. My reasons here are not based on a priori intuition but rather on empirical grounds concerning how slurs are actually used in natural language. And because the inquiry here is a linguistic one, I do not purport to impose a license on what is acceptable for a community of fully rational and competent speakers to agree in doing while engaging in conversation with one another. On my view, if prejudicially targeted speakers have discovered a genuine linguistic means for actively subverting the forms of prejudice that they have historically been subject to – which empirical studies by Galinsky et al. (2013) suggest is the case – then I can only commend those speakers on their linguistic ingenuity, attempt to help others understand how this works through careful and open-minded consideration at all.

Although the claims and empirical studies discussed in this section are neither completely unchallengeable nor entirely uncontroversial, when taken together, they provide a compelling case against PE’s view that slurs always and necessarily express offense. In holding this claim we have seen that the purely expressive view most recently endorsed by Hedger (2012, 2013) is unable to account for the growing empirical literature on slurs showing otherwise, and so must continuously dismiss this growing body of research on purely a priori grounds. So it would seem that remaining committed to the intuition that slurs always offend, in light of the growing literature on their non-offensive in-group use, could be based on little more than the (perhaps implicit) assumption that the claims made by those that are typically the targets and re-appropriators of slurs (most of which are minorities) must somehow be naïvely inaccurate and that their distinctive in-group practices (including strategic instances of norm reversal and reappropriation) are unworthy of any serious scholarly consideration at all.35 I hope to have put forward a serious challenge to this view here, and plead that future work on slurs proceed with a more socio-culturally aware and empirically sensitive ear. Arguably, this will lead not only to more socially responsible scholarship on slurs, but reveal that the phenomenon of slurring in particular, and natural language more generally, is more intricate and fascinating than one might have initially supposed a priori.

6. Conclusion

To review, our discussion in this article has proceeded as follows. Section 1 provided an introduction and Section 2 reviewed what slurs are along with several basic facts that an adequate framework for slurs ought to account for. Two such facts included (a) that slurs are differentially applied towards targets with different descriptive features, and (b) that slurs are capable of packing some of the nastiest punches natural language has to offer. In Section 3 we reviewed the purely expressive account of slurs (PE) most recently and explicitly advocated by Hedger (2012, 2013) and looked at how the projection behavior of slurs differs markedly from that of expressions with purely descriptive content. We saw that PE was able to use an analysis of the projection behavior of slurs to both (i) support their claim that slurs are not expressions with purely descriptive content, and (ii) account for the fact (b) that slurs are capable of packing some of the nastiest punches natural language has to offer. We next reviewed three key cases Hedger (2012, 2013) considered in support of PE’s claim that slurs are expressions with purely expressive content: the first where Hedger (2012) found different translations for English “cuss words” in Spanish, the second where “It would be odd to claim that this person [that yells f*ck in frustration] has described the wrench or the car as being a certain way” (p. 77), and the third where “a person of Swedish decent” still manages to be offended by “a slur normally used to target blacks” (p. 78). We critically evaluated these cases in Section 4, finding that all of the arguments presented in support of PE are problematic and that the case for PE remains weak. Finally, in Section 5, we looked at several recent empirical considerations on the non-derogatory use of slurs, which furthered demonstrated the implausibility of PE along with the a priori assumptions that motivate it.

To be clear, this article has shown that Hedger’s (2012, 2013) case in support of pure expressivism (PE) fails at least in the following 11 ways: (1) it illegitimately draws conclusions about slurs (e.g., gook) from analyses of cuss words (e.g., f*ck); (2)

it fails to consider the different ways in which different (e.g., racial and sexual) slurs have conventionally been used (e.g., in race-directed and sex-directed acts, respectively) and are commonly understood; (3) it fails to account for the fact (a) that slurs are differentially applied towards targets with different descriptive features; (4) it falsely suggests that no one in particular tends to feel particularly targeted by particular slurs; (5) it wrongly suggests that if anyone in particular were to feel especially targeted by a particular slur, they would be feeling offended unreasonably; (6) it conflates being the target of a potentially offensive act with being the witness of a potentially offensive act; (7) it fails to account for how slurs have the capacity for particularly targeted offensiveness; (8) it fails to account for both lexical aptness and target aptness; (9) it fails to account for the empirical fact that slurs can be used non-offensively; (10) it fails to offer insight into the dynamics of derogatory force behind slurs, considering neither their synchronic nor diachronic variation; (11) it does not take into consideration the linguistic behavior and explicit reports of robust populations of fully competent (in-group, typically minority) speakers, prejudging in advance that only self-confirming evidence should be taken seriously. In showing that PE is clearly inadequate in at least these 11 ways, we have also found at least 11 reasons for believing that an adequate account of slurs will involve not only an expressive component but a descriptive component also. That is to say, slurs are best accounted for by a mixed or hybrid approach, as I have argued here and outlined in other recent work.

Let us end our discussion on slurs with a relevant lesson from Wittgenstein (1953):

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. – Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicacity. A perspicacious representation produces just that understanding that consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases. (§122)

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For my mother and father with love.

References


